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Abstract. The study examines the new act on business associations passed in 2006. It 
concludes, that the general principles, the structure of the Hungarian corporate law have 
remained unchanged since 1988, however, because of the practical demands and the European 
legal harmonization requirements a new act on business associations was necessary. The new 
act introduced several entrepreneur-friendly legal institutions and carried out a significant 
deregulation as well. 
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On 1st July, 2006, the new Act on Business Associations (hereinafter: ABA) 
took effect. It is by that time the third pertinent act framed in this field, since 
the first ABA was promulgated as Act VI of 1988, the second one was adopted 
as Act CXLIV of 1997, and finally, Act IV of 2006 was adopted as the third 
ABA. 
 
 
1. A New Act in Its Form−Supplementary Law in Substance 
 
Legislation concerning business associations in the recent 20 years has had a 
specific history in Hungary.  
 The first ABA was framed nearly two years before the political transfor-
mation, in a period, which was marked by an economic policy purported to 
introduce mixed economy in the framework of a liberal, albeit socialist political 
establishment, according to which, in line with the non-corporate “socialist 
sector”, private business associations (Hungarian enterprises and joint ventures) 
would operate as a second sector, essentially in a similar manner to the current 
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working of the economy in China and Vietnam.1 However, due to minor amend-
ments (under Act XIII of 1989 and Acts LIII, LIV and LV of 1992), the first 
ABA was still applicable, when, in lieu of the mere change of the economic 
model, political transformation ensued in the autumn of 1989, furthermore, it 
could adequately ground the operation both of partially privatised, formerly state-
owned companies and of the formerly rudimentary small-scale enterprises 
(economic working communities (GMKs), entrepreneurial working teams 
(VGMKs), small-cooperatives, specialised groups) in prevailing forms of post-
transformation business associations. The ABA of 1988 proved to be progressive 
in several branches of business law, as well, primarily in re the Company Act 
of 1989, the Competition Act of 1990, the Act on Securities, Act XLIX of 1991 
on Bankruptcy Proceedings, Liquidation Proceedings and Voluntary Dissolution 
(hereinafter: ABP) and the Act on Accountancy. Owing to the adoption of the 
ABA, Hungary gained a remarkable competitive edge over neighbouring former 
socialist states. As the above demonstrate, fundamental law substantiating 
the newly evolving bourgeois market economy was drafted preceding the mid-
nineties, which facilitated that more foreign working capital flowed into Hungary 
before 1995, than into other European former socialist states en masse. 
 As regards the second ABA, which took effect on 16th June, 1998, it was 
designed to prepare the entry of Hungary in the European Union. Accordingly, 
previous practical experience had been analysed, harmony with associated legal 
branches, primarily with law pertaining to capital markets and accountancy had 
been attained. Within the purview of Act XXXIX of 1995, systematic privati-
sation en masse had been in the main accomplished by 1997, consequently, 
private ownership became predominant in Hungarian proprietary structure, 
hence, the discrepancies of the first ABA deriving from the regulation of state 
ownership could be eliminated and the second ABA could be drafted to 
comply with its original purpose of constituting basic business law in support 
of the emerging system of modern capitalism. By 1997, the development of the 
technical and incorporate infrastructure of firmprocedure law accorded with 
that of the ABA, so far as Act CXLV of 1997 on Firmregistration (herein-
after: Firmregister Act) qualified as ancillary law of the ABA, wherefore, the 
rule pertaining to the obligation of ex nunc registration of companies, which 
had incurred numerous anomalies, could be annulled. As a matter of fact, the 
second ABA complied with most requirements posited by EU directives under 
  
 1 On the process of drafting the first ABA, see, A tulajdonreformról a társasági tör-
vény után (On the Reform of Ownership Following the Adoption of the Act on Business 
Associations). OKKFT, Budapest, 1989. 
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company law, therefore, no major amendment of company law was necessary 
upon the accession of Hungary to the EU. 
 The third ABA was adopted by Parliament in December, 2005, neverthe-
less, its full recognition as well as political culture required that it did not take 
effect preceding parliamentary elections. However, the basic principles, frame-
work and structure of company law established within the scope of the first 
ABA in Hungary were not modified under the third ABA. This also results 
from the fact unparalleled in the history of the codification of Hungarian 
business law, i.e., each ABA was drafted by the same Codification Committee, 
last time joined by young colleagues headed by Gábor Gadó.2 Basically, at the 
end of the 1980s, we elaborated the codification technique of protecting the 
integrity of the ABA from political influence so far as possible, therefore, we 
laid down that 
 – its annual amendment, which is customary in re law concerning the 
capital market and accountancy, shall be avoided,   
 – the revision of the ABA in re its institutions shall be accomplished every 
6–10 years and the required amendments shall be introduced, 
 – such revision eventuating in drafting new law shall be optimally scheduled 
by the end of the third year of government sessions, since the least 
forthcoming amending drafts submitted to Parliament are expectable in 
that period, 
 – the new law shall be submitted for acceptance both by business federa-
tions and the government opposition, so that the contingently ensuing 
change of government does not incur the comprehensive amendment of 
the ABA. This modus operandi worked well both in 1998 and in 2006.  
 The revision of the ABA approximately every 8 years is also deemed 
inevitable, because 
 a) the company law of the EU is still developing, as it incessantly changes 
and its progress is cyclic. On the one hand, long-standing directives are 
amended (e.g., the amendment of Directive no. 2 on the Formation of 
Corporations and Assets is permanent) as well as new directives are 
framed (for instance, in trust law), on the other hand, supranational 
corporations regulated under Union law (e.g., European corporations may 
  
 2 In all of the three cases, it was Tamás Sárközy (responsible for the general part) that 
headed the Codification Committee with the participation of members, such as György 
Wellmann [responsible for the chapters on unlimited partnerships (kkt.) and limited partner-
ships (bt.)], Gábor Komáromi [responsible for the chapters on limited liability companies 
(kft.)], Tamás Sándor [responsible for the chapter on companies limited by shares (rt.)] and 
János Kálmán. 
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be formed in Hungary) operate as competitors of companies regulated 
by domestic law, 
 b) the reach of technical development is significant, with respect to the 
gradual introduction of electronic company procedures, electronic exercise 
of members’ rights, digitalisation of the operation of company organs, 
 c) the development of associated legal branches must be taken into account, 
such as competition law upon framing trust law, accountancy law upon 
the regulation of company assets, as well as requirements set forth under 
law concerning the capital market upon the codification of law concerning 
public limited companies, 
 d) finally, the periodical assessment of experience obtained in the course 
of the application of company law by attorneys, the Court of Registration 
and during judicial proceedings is necessary.  
 In view of the fact that both the second and the third ABAs are supplementary 
law in substance, the technical justification for drafting new law was required. 
Since it is not only lawyers, but also enterprises, tax advisors and auditors 
whose work is comprehensively and directly determined by the rules of the 
ABA, we assumed that the development of the ABA into a labyrinth of rules 
(such as the Act on the State Budget and the Act on Capital Markets are) had 
to be prevented. Consequently, the reformulation of the ABA had to be 
accomplished in terms of the revision of its institutions. The requirement of 
lucidity was further supported by the observance of the following rules: 
 a) The ABA shall be formulated in accordance with classical codification 
principles. Therefore, it is specified as a principal rule that an article may 
consist of a maximum of 6 paragraphs, a paragraph may consist of max. 
3 sentences and the combined justification of max. 2 articles is permitted. 
The latter rule was breached in some cases as a result of ministerial 
harmonisation and parliamentary debate (see, Article 202 regulating the 
share register as a pertinent instance). 
 b) No enforcement decree issued by an organ of public administration may 
be appended to the ABA. (As an apparent exception, we must mention 
the government authorisation related to Company Law Advisory Bodies, 
which, however, does not affect the substance of company law.) 
 In the course of the codification process in 2005, the former textual scope 
of the ABA could be basically retained, in spite of the fact that the number of 
articles during the administrative harmonisation and parliamentary debate, 
marked by newly prevalent legislative vehemence, increased by approx. 10 p.c. 
Unfortunately, the objective of public administration to extend its scope of 
authority could also just partly be curtailed. Therefore, the scope of the activity 
of the Service of the Ministry of Justice Providing Information about Companies 
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and Assisting Electronic Firm Procedures (an appalling designation) (IM Cég-
információs és Elektronikus Cégeljárásban Közreműködő Szolgálata) was 
considerably extended as per Para. (2) of Article 1 of Firmregistration Act (by, 
e.g., the provision of legal advisory service), furthermore, upon the motion 
made by an MP, in support of the work of the Ministry of Justice, a Company 
Law Advisory Body was established as per Article 332 of ABA, which may 
consist of as many as 100 members and renders expert opinions of “scholarly 
character” in three-member committees. The Advisory Body may contest the 
role of arbitration courts, which is a barely agreeable tendency. Over-meticulous 
regulation is more distinguishable in the Firmregistration Act, than in the 
ABA, albeit, excessive attentiveness to details results naturally from the 
character of procedural law.  
 The inherent objective of the third ABA to safeguard continuity is high-
lighted by the fact that its effect pertains merely to new business associations 
founded on deeds of association that were submitted to the Court of Registra-
tion subsequently to 1st July, 2006. Business associations that had submitted 
data for registration and operated before 1st July, 2006 may continue operation 
within the purview of the second ABA either until the first change effected 
in their data or until 1st September, 2007, the latest. Under the ABA of 1997, 
no ultimate deadline for adjustment was determined for associations, which 
incurred disturbances in practice. Nonetheless, business associations that 
operated upon the adoption of the third ABA have been guaranteed a period of 
nearly two years for adjustment. This, in case of the majority of associations, 
probably implies that they will adopt deeds of association (Memoranda and 
Articles of Association of Companies) that comply with the third ABA at 
ordinary general/members’ meetings assembling in the spring of 2007. We 
cannot fail to mention that in re the third ABA, which stipulates very few 
cogent rules in comparison with the second ABA, adaptation in the majority of 
cases will implicate benefiting from the specified additional options and their 
introduction into the deeds of association of already operating companies. 
Associations that will fail to implement the new cogent rules of the third ABA 
by 1st September, 2007 will be coerced in the scope of legality supervision 
proceedings conducted by the Court of Registration either to institute a valid 
legal framework for their operation or to ultimately terminate operation under 
Article 81 of Company Act. 
 In order to demonstrate that no emergency to codify the third ABA obtained, 
we must point out that provisions incurring momentous changes in social-
economic circumstances will take effect subsequently to 1st July, 2007, that is, 
one year later, than the date of taking effect of less consequential provisions. A 
relevant instance is the revocation of the regulation of non-profit companies 
232 TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
  
(kht.) under Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code (hereinafter: Civil Code) and the 
concurrent introduction under the third ABA of the non-profit character as an 
option to pertain to all forms of business associations after 1st July, 2007. Non-
profit companies (kht.) that will still operate at that date shall be permitted to 
continue operation for a further period of two years. A second instance is the 
omission of the regulation governing joint enterprises as a form of business 
associations under the third ABA, since no new joint ventures were established 
following 1990, whereas, the joint enterprises registered before the third ABA 
took effect (more, than 100 companies) would be permitted to continue operation 
in concert with the second ABA without time limitation. To conclude the array 
of instances, the termination of the employment of executive officials as such 
of unlimited partnerships (kkt.), limited partnerships (bt.) and limited liability 
companies (kft.) is prescribed within the purview of the third ABA, which in 
fact guarantees a provisional period of five years for compliance subsequently 
to its taking effect. We expect that the application of the third ABA will admit 
equal flexibility in practice.  
 With respect to terminology, the designation of various organs of business 
associations was in several cases simplified and unified under the third ABA. 
For instance, in re business unions, the term of members’ meeting was in-
troduced instead of the misleading term of the board of managers. As for the 
regulation of unlimited and limited partnerships (kkt. and bt.), the alternatively 
used “general meeting” and “members’ meeting” were uniformly superseded by 
the term of “members’ meeting”, which serves to underline the emphatic vague-
ness concerning the main organ of the simplest forms of association as opposed to 
that of the Ltd. On condition that it is only in these formal respects that the 
deeds of association of unlimited partnerships and business unions depart from 
the new law, we can barely assume that explicit emendation will be deemed 
necessary (for instance, the substitution of the established term of general meeting 
by members’ meeting). Scilicet, bureaucratic formalism should be duly avoided 
in company law, even if technical problems may arise in the trade register as a 
consequence. 
 
 
2. The Relation of the ABA to Other Significant Regulations of Business Law 
 
The reformulation of the ABA allowed the reconsideration of its relation to 
other regulations of basic business law. 
 a) In the course of re-codification, the Codification Committee intended to 
more systematically incorporate substantive provisions into the ABA 
and procedural provisions into the Company Act, thereby, to circumvent 
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repetitions and overlaps. Accordingly, the ABA includes merely general 
provisions pertaining to the legality supervision of business associations, 
since the detailed provisions are set forth in the Firmregistration Act, 
given that these are special proceedings conducted by the Court of 
Registration. The provisions specifying the reasons for the invalidity of 
deeds of association are basically formulated in the ABA, whereas, 
judicial contestation of the decision on company registration on grounds 
of the invalidity of deeds of association is admissible pursuant to Article 
69 of Firmregistration Act on “action for the establishment of the nullity 
of company foundation”. Nevertheless, in some cases, with regard to 
the objective of safeguarding the uniformity of regulation, the ABA also 
specifies rules of procedure (such as the rule of the judicial contestation 
of decisions adopted by business associations and the plea in expulsion), 
at the same time, the Firmregistration Act also includes substantive 
provisions pertaining to, e.g., the name of the company, the company 
seat and registered offices. 
 b) Interference with other legal branches could be avoided within the 
scope of the third ABA, for instance, the stipulations that guarantee 
tax allowances for foreign investors as well as tax-free and duty-free 
implementation of reorganisation were repealed, since these matters are 
already regulated under tax law. For political reasons, some exceptions 
had to be made, e.g., the stipulation that labour relations prevailing at 
business associations shall be regulated in accordance with the Labour 
Code was upheld under Article 8 of ABA, which, from a professional 
viewpoint, is an expressly redundant provision.  
 c) Its relation to the new, currently reformulated Civil Code became 
unambiguous. It is definite that the endeavour to integrate the ABA into 
the Civil Code was obstructed, since the uniformity and substantiveness 
of the ABA as a code must be retained even following the completion 
of the new draft Civil Code, in re firstly, company law constitutes a 
complex legal branch, secondly, its textual scope and technical character. 
To that effect, the specificity of company law is now adequately 
articulated under Para. (2) of Article 9 of ABA, according to which, 
although, the Civil Code constitutes secondary law substantiating the 
ABA, in cases related to business associations, the Civil Code shall be 
not literally, but “appropriately” applicable. As the Supreme Court 
reasonably ruled, according to the solution based on the principle of 
clausula rebus sic substantibus, Article 241 of the Civil Code shall not 
be applicable in case of deeds of association concluded for an indefinite 
period. Scilicet, Part 4 of the Civil Code on Contract Law is modelled 
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on bilateral barter agreements, whereas, deeds of association specifically 
establish multi-entity organisational liability.  
 As a matter of fact, the effect of company law on Part 2 on Entities of the 
currently formulated new Civil Code can be positively discerned.3 Its constructive 
aspect is that several solutions of company law (e.g., pre-association posited as 
pre-legal entity or reorganisation by universal legal succession) that were 
met by reluctance on the part of experts of civil law back in 1988 are being 
abstracted under the new draft Civil Code. Its detrimental aspect, as to my 
view, is that the draft Civil Code adopts the institutions of company law in 
extraneous areas, as well. Namely, by reason of the recent radical curtailment 
of the permitted period for company registration, the import of pre-associations 
has also remarkably decreased in company law, therefore, the regulation of 
the formation of, e.g., “pre-foundations” under the new Civil Code seems even 
more problematic. In contrast with company law, in which considerable 
deregulation was effectuated under the third ABA, the Chapter of the draft 
Civil Code on Legal Entities (as an overextended counter-effect of former under-
regulatedness) is incredibly over-regulated, so far as it completely unnecessarily 
introduces institutions of company law under provisions concerning ideal legal 
entities, such as the supervisory board and the auditor, which have gradually 
become discretionary in company law, as well.4(4) 
 a) In the course of drafting the third ABA, we focused on the requirement 
of harmony with accountancy law, which was all the more deemed im-
perative, since EU company law directives abound in accountancy rules. 
To that effect, the observation of the terms of accountancy is more relevant 
under rules governing procedures of reorganisation, capital increase and 
reduction in the third ABA, than in its antecedents. Nonetheless, we 
intended to manifest that it is accountancy law that needs to be adjusted 
to basic solutions of company law, not vice versa. Therefore, when a 
business association is finally registered by the Court of Registration, 
the pre-association shall be finally and automatically established as a 
business association, i.e., the prescription of “a closing accountancy 
measure” is regarded as an excessively bureaucratic measure and to be 
abolished. 
  
 3 The Chapter of the draft Civil Code on Entities has been introduced for professional 
debate by the Ministry of Justice on its home page. 
 4 See, the critique by Sárközy T.: Alternatív javaslat „A jogi személyek általános sza-
bályaira” (Alternative Proposal for “the General Regulation Pertaining to Legal Entities”), 
Polgári Jogi Kodifikáció, nos. 4−5/2005. 
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 b) Upon the formulation of the Chapter on Companies Limited by Shares in 
the third ABA, its relation to the permanently evolving and incessantly 
amended Act of 2001 on Capital Markets (hereinafter: ACM) posed a 
dilemma. In my view, the ACM represents a peculiarly low quality 
regulation, its over-regulated and frequently self-contradictory provisions 
preclude its harmony with the third ABA, which would be a prerequisite 
of law-making despite the different approaches of the two legal areas. 
Consequently, we endeavoured to distinctly demarcate the scopes of the 
ABA and the ACM, to that effect, the scope of trust law under the ABA 
is restricted exclusively to the regulation of close companies limited by 
shares (zrt.) and limited liability companies (kft.), whereas, the rules of 
take-over procedures pertaining to public limited companies are specified 
under the ACM (redrafted incidentally with particular incoherence), 
even so, the contradictions in many cases couldn’t be resolved without 
the violation of the rationale of company law. A recent “achievement” 
consists in the before-mentioned comprehensive amendment of the 
ACM under Act CLXXXVI of 2005 in December, 2005, which was 
followed by the latest amendment of the ACM under Act XXII of 2006 
in January, 2006. The latter act contains an innovation unparalleled in 
the history of Hungarian law-making, scilicet, it stipulates under Para. 
(4) of Article 6 that Paras. (1)−(2) of Article 354 of the third ABA “shall 
not take effect”. 
 
 
3. Deliberate Progress from the Past to the Future 
 
The third ABA took effect in a period, when the basic trends of the next decade 
(perhaps decades) were already relatively adumbrated, viz., the accentuation of 
the requirements entailed by globalisation and information society as well as 
the consolidation of European integration. We presumed that our principal 
assignments in this situation were, on the one hand, the sustenance of domestic 
traditions of company law, on the other hand, continued adjustment to the 
international development of company law by constant modernisation. In this 
respect, we had to take into account the following crucial factors.  
 The efforts of the European Union to create the unity of law, which per se 
accords with our objectives, by directives that concentrate on guaranteeing the 
uniformity of rules that govern primarily entities of the world of big business, 
that is, public limited companies, banks, insurance companies, investment 
funds, etc., also define the scope in which we need to consider the eventuality 
that supranational corporations founded in compliance with EU directives will 
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prevail over business associations founded on domestic law. Furthermore, 
Union law is more and more intensely overwhelming the national legislation of 
member states based on continental law with solutions originating in the 
Anglo-Saxon legal system, which has adverse effects and sometimes entails 
confusion in domestic law.5 For instance, at the beginning of this decade, 
German legislation was also obliged to frame separate law on capital markets 
and to co-opt a take-over procedure modelled on the US pattern in re public 
limited companies. Consequently, German corporations tend to abandon German 
company law (therefore, a recent session of the Deutscher Juristentag was 
marked by bewilderment) and reorganise as European corporations, which admit 
the board system. Thereby, they can evade the most characteristic institution of 
modern German company law, that is, the so-called parity Mitbestimmung 
(equally shared decision-making), which implies equal participation by employees 
in supervisory boards.6 
 In view of the above, the Codification Committee relied on the following 
conclusions upon framing the third ABA: 
 a) Attempts at the trivialisation and homogenisation of traditional forms of 
small- and medium-scale business associations need to be resisted. For 
several years, approx. 8,000 unlimited partnerships [(kkt.) as a typical 
form of micro-enterprises], 120,000 limited partnerships [(bt.) as a form 
of small-scale enterprises] and 220,000 limited liability companies [(kft.) 
as a typical form of medium-scale associations] have operated agreeably 
on grounds of permissive regulation in substance and in effect.7 The more 
positively contractual character of unlimited and limited partnerships 
was upheld and reinforced under the third ABA, while the efforts to 
declare these two forms of association legal entities were defied. The 
aspect of ltd.s constituted as associations of entities (e.g., the institution 
of several managers, but no board of managers is permitted), which 
distinguishes them from companies limited by shares, was maintained. 
Without doubt, the rules pertaining to close companies limited by shares 
  
 5 See, e.g., Halbhuber, Limited Company statt GmbH? Europarechtlicher Rahmen und 
deutscher Widerstand (Limited Company in lieu of GmbH? EU Legal Framework and 
German Resistance)., Baden-Baden, 2001. 
 6 Qualität und Preis am Markt für Gesellschaftsformen (Quality and Price on the 
Market for Business Associations). Zeitschrift für Unternehmens und Gesellschaftsrecht, 
no. 3/2004. 
 7 Para. (1) of Article 9 of ABA established cogency in form as a principal rule, since 
the efforts to formulate the permissive regulation of unlimited and limited partnerships and 
ltd.s (kkt.–bt.–kft.) during codification failed. In effect, however, the third ABA advanced 
distinctly towards permissive regulation. 
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and ltd.s, respectively, show more correlation, but the rapprochement 
eventuated basically owing to the regulation of companies limited by 
shares (e.g., preference shares that secure the right of pre-emption). 
 b) It needs to be prospectively prevented that large-scale associations in 
Hungary relinquish the rule of domestic law and opt for Community law. 
Consequently, the third ABA, in an unprecedented manner in Hungarian 
company law, permits that the entities forming public corporations opt 
for the board system according to the model of Anglo-American integrate 
management in lieu of the German model of shared management. That 
integrate managing organ is designated as board of directors, which is 
distinguished from general management under the third ABA. That 
solution obviously benefits investors from the US, Britain and the Far-
East, however, permission of the establishment of boards of directors for 
ltd.s and close companies limited by shares would have been an evident 
excess. 
 c) In accordance with the development of information technology, the third 
ABA allows to some extent both the exercise of members’ rights and 
the operation of association organs, i.e., general meeting, management, 
supervisory boards via means of information technology, although, we 
must acknowledge that access to these facilities is not immediate reality 
for Hungarian entrepreneurs. The basic rules are stipulated under Article 
20, nevertheless, the chapters on ltd.s, and particularly, on companies 
limited by shares prescribe several special rules that govern, e.g., holding 
general meetings via video-conferences. Simultaneously, the use of these 
modern facilities is safeguarded by the rule that it may not infringe either 
members’ rights to equal protection of the law or equal opportunity for 
participation in business matters.  
 d) With respect to the purpose of modernisation, it was not only Anglo-
Saxon/Anglo-American solutions that we took into consideration. In my 
view, a momentous according step consists in the co-optation under 
Chapter 5 of the regulation pertaining to trusts already well-established 
in the Hungarian business world, and consequently, to the acquisition 
agreement from German law.8 The acquisition agreement is obviously 
not a typical element under civil law, its introduction was challenged both 
theoretically and functionally. Nevertheless, due to the institution of the 
acquisition agreement, the implementation of a uniform economic policy 
  
 8 See Mielicke, J.: Konzern durch Beherrschungs und Ergebnisübernahmeverträge 
(Trusts via Acquisitions and Take-Over Agreements), Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels 
und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR), no. 4/2001. 
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will be considerably more refined, relations within the trust will become 
more perspicuous, the reasonable interests of the shareholders, creditors 
and the management of subsidiaries will be more defensible. As a matter 
of course, voluntary registration by trusts may not be immediately 
expected, therefore, the ABA can prove to be a progressive and program-
matic statute, furthermore, the provisions of Article 64 of ABA governing 
effective trusts also admit the judicial enforcement of registration.  
 e) The consistent effectuation of the purpose of modernisation was not 
feasible for an economic and a legal reason in one area, that is, the 
distinction of corporations in terms of forms of operation. Firstly, 
economic policy-makers did not concur with the solution customary in 
Western Europe (which had not been included in the conception of 
the ABA, either), namely, that public limited companies would be 
peremptorily classified as companies quoted at the Stock Exchange. 
Scilicet, in this case, a corporation not quoted at the Stock Exchange 
would be automatically classified as a close company limited by shares. 
On condition that the public limited company is concurrently quoted, 
market self-adjustment could supersede a substantial range of legal 
regulations. Therefore, the regulation of corporate governance would 
not have been incorporated into the Section of the ABA pertaining to 
public limited companies, but, in concert with the German model, the 
issuance of an ethical code on corporate governance would have sufficed.9 
Secondly, as regards the legal reason, pursuant to the amendment of the 
ACM approximately one year before the adoption of the third ABA, the 
distinction of close and public corporations had been established in 
company law and in the Hungarian business world also to be denoted in 
the designation of corporations as abbreviations Zrt. and Nyrt., which is 
unfamiliar in Western-Europe and non-transplantable into English or 
German. This solution should have been interfered with under the third 
ABA within one year, which would have been evidently arguable from 
the point of view of legal policy. 
 f) The prima facie dogmatic solution of the separate designations of Zrt. 
and Nyrt. is based on the assumption that, if the scope of public limited 
companies does not coincide with the scope of quoted companies, EU 
directives concerning public limited companies will either govern all 
Hungarian corporations, or close companies limited by shares will have 
  
 9 Ringleb, H. H.–Kremer, T.–Lutter, M.–Werder, A.: Kommentar zum Deutschen 
Corporate Governance Kodex (Commentary on the German Corporate Governance Code). 
Munich, 2005. 18–21. 
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to be distinctly differentiated from public limited companies. In an effort 
to effectuate the latter alternative, the law-maker stipulated under Para. 
(3) of Article 171 of ACM that close and public operation shall be denoted 
in the designation of the company. This solution, however, is obviously 
defective in my judgement, because, on the one hand, it would have 
sufficed to denote the form of operation in line with the designation, not 
in the designation of the company. Namely, in re the obligation set forth 
under Para. (1) of Article 4 of ABA, according to which the non-profit 
character of corporations shall be indicated in the designation of the 
company, the abbreviation of non-profit close corporations will be NpZrt. 
On the other hand, even if we intend to denote the form of operation in 
the designation, it would have amply sufficed to prescribe the denotation 
of Nyrt. for at most 100 corporations that operate publicly out of the 
approx. 4,000 corporations, since all other corporations would have 
been necessarily classified as close corporations. Whereas, in this status 
quo, we have imposed substantial costs and administrative burden on 
our corporations (e.g., new firm stamps, bank-papers, exchange of shares, 
etc.), which contradicts the basic objectives of legal regulation.  
 g) The indefinite differentiation of close companies limited by shares from 
public limited companies incurred a structural problem in law-making, 
viz., the structure of Chapter 10 of ABA on Corporations is excessively 
complicated. It is introduced by a General Section encompassing Articles 
172–183, which is followed by detailed regulation that constitutes the 
principal rules under Articles 184–284 pertaining to close companies 
limited by shares, subsequently, the auxiliary and departing rules 
governing public limited companies are specified under Articles 285–
315, and finally, corporate governance recommendations of the Budapest 
Stock Exchange concerning quoted public limited companies conclude 
Chapter 10. Obviously, the identification of the scope of quoted public 
limited companies with that of public limited companies would have 
eventuated considerably more undemanding and easily applicable 
regulation. 
 h) With respect to Union law, we may eventually establish that law-making 
in Hungary should not verbatim adopt EU directives (which equals 
mere adaptation by “translation”), but the recognition of the purpose of 
legal policy is imperative, which may facilitate its implementation by 
legal instruments inherent in the Hungarian legal system. Therefore, for 
instance, the unreasonable adaptation of EU directives governing public 
limited companies to unions of entities is inappropriate, however, that 
practice has prevailed in re, e.g., the invalidity of deeds association since 
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1991, that is, the effect of Directive no. 1 of 1968 on Harmonisation of 
Safeguards for Business Associations has been extended to irrelevant 
areas not designed by law-makers of the EU. Furthermore, the adoption 
of still non-effective EU norms as a manifestation of “pushing forward” 
is also deemed inappropriate, which, nevertheless, had ensued in terms 
of the limitation of one-entity associations under the second ABA, 
nullified under Para. (4) of Article 5 of the third ABA. Nonetheless, in 
the course of codification of the third ABA, the adoption of the more 
rigorous, currently drafted EU regulation pertaining to auditors was 
propounded (e.g., of the provision that auditors’ contracts of agency shall 
not be renewed), however, we defied and the contingent later settlement 
has been referred to the competence of accountancy law.  
 
 
4. A Pro-Entrepreneur Approach 
 
The third ABA is marked by an approach that emphatically favours entrepre-
neurs with the exception of the elements specified under Point e) of Section 3 
above. According to the standpoint of the Codification Committee,  
 a) if the interests of entrepreneurs, public administration, the Court of 
Registration or attorneys (notaries public) conflict, entrepreneurial interests 
shall be promoted, 
 b) the facilitation of more expeditious, inexpensive and simple formation 
of enterprises and of their operation shall be necessary. 
 c) For the purpose of the accomplishment of the objectives above, the third 
ABA substantially deregulates, i.e., crucially diminishes the adminis-
trative burden imposed on associated parties and extends the scope of 
permissive regulation via basic reinforcement of the autonomy of 
associated parties and the specification of a broad set of applicable 
options for organisation and operation. The third ABA is based on the 
assumption that nearly 18 years after the restitution of company law in 
Hungary, both company law and business culture are adequately refined 
to admit such “liberal” regulation and its flexible implementation. 
 In the following passages, we’ll expose some instances of such pro-entre-
preneur approach:  
 a) As to my point of view, the deregulation of the sphere of operation of 
business associations is particularly important. The third ABA sets forth 
the principle of the permission of all sorts of activities that are not 
prohibited or limited by law, even if the respective activity is not itemised 
in the sphere of activities. The business association shall be obligated to 
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indicate only one main activity in its sphere of activities, whereas, all 
other activities shall be included in the trade register at the specific 
according request of the association. This new regulation will basically 
change the proceedings of the tax authority. 
 b) Upon the advent of political transformation, it was justifiable to adminis-
tratively limit the terms of the mandates of executive officials and the 
number of assumable executive positions, the limitation of which, how-
ever, is no longer required. Therefore, the limiting rule prescribing that 
one entity may concurrently fulfil executive positions at maximum three 
different associations was repealed under the third ABA. Whilst, the 
principal rule stipulating that appointments shall be valid for a definite, 
but at most for a five-year period was maintained as a permissive 
regulation. Therefore, deeds of association may permit that executive 
officials will be appointed for an indefinite period, in the case of which, 
mandates for indefinite periods may be conferred on supervisory board 
members, as well. At the same time and after much delay, the third ABA 
finally institutes the maxim of distinction between the legal relations of 
executive officials under company law (substantiated by the rules of 
contracts of agency under the Civil Code, albeit, such legal relations 
shall not be established by contracts of agency) and other potential 
employment of the concerned executive officials by the respective 
association. By the generalisation of the rule formerly pertaining merely to 
corporations, Para. (2) of Article 22 of ABA stipulates that the mandates 
of executive officials shall not be assumed in employment. Therefore, 
the legal consequences of mandates of executive officials governed by 
company law (the fulfilment of which may be either gratuitous or 
subject to consideration) shall be consistently differentiated from those of 
the potential employment of executive officials in other positions (e.g., 
in the director’s position) at the specific association, which shall be 
unequivocally grounded on the Labour Code. Therefore, the general 
manager of a limited liability company may exclusively fulfil the position 
of managing director concurrently, on condition that the appointments 
are established on grounds of two separate scopes of legal relations. 
However, in view of the fact that the majority of ltd.s in Hungary have 
accommodated interwoven legal relations under company and labour law, 
this subtle regulation will merely govern legal relations established 
subsequently to 1st July, 2006. Whereas, the parties concerned shall be 
guaranteed a reasonable provisory period for the settlement of prevailing 
legal relations, since the legal relations of executive officials instituted 
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preceding 1st July, 2006 may be eventually upheld for a further period of 
five years.  
 c) Under the third ABA, the significant reinforcement of permissive 
regulation extends the scope of entrepreneurial liberties. Although, for 
technical reasons of drafting, the cogency of its rules was maintained by 
virtue of Para. (1) of Article 9, owing to the General Section and to the 
rules governing specific forms of business associations, the freedom 
of parties to depart from the majority of the rules of the ABA was 
considerably expanded. The last phrase of Para. (1) of Article 9 stipulates 
with general effect that, if the departure from the ABA consists in the 
co-optation of a solution not recognised under the ABA, it will be 
regarded permissible (which formerly in most cases had been reversely 
adjudicated by the Court of Registration), with the exception (a safeguarding 
general clause is inserted), if the respective solution contradicts a) the 
general purpose of company law, or, b) the objectives of the regulation 
pertaining to the respective form of association, or, c) infringes the basic 
principle of bona fide exercise of rights pursuant to the Civil Code. In 
re the specific forms of association, due to the formulation of rules per 
se, approx. 95 p.c. of the regulation concerning unlimited and limited 
partnerships (kkt.–bt.) is currently de facto permissive, whereas, more 
than 50 p.c. of the regulation of ltd.s (kft.) and nearly 50 p.c. of the 
regulation of close companies limited by shares are also permissive in 
my judgement. In this scope, the substantial enhancement of the per-
missiveness of the regulation of close corporations is peculiarly emphatic, 
considering that the form of operation of the overwhelming majority of 
corporations in Hungary is close. Accordingly, it is unprecedented in 
the regulation of corporations in Hungary that the optional establish-
ment of the supervisory board is permitted [dependent on the respective 
claim of fifty per cent of the shareholders (nominal value rate) of the 
close corporation]. As to ltd.s, the establishment of supervisory boards is 
completely discretionary, in addition, the regulation of the institution of 
employee participation is permissive, as well. The rule that in case of 
associations with more than 200 full-time employees on an annual average, 
one-third the supervisory board members shall be appointed by the 
general/members’ meeting upon the nomination of the works council 
was maintained, but the management of the association and the works 
council may conclude a deviating agreement. Which implies that in 
return for, e.g., pay-rise or the provision of social, etc. surplus services, the 
community of employees may renounce due participation rights. This 
may exclusively eventuate on a voluntary basis and in compensation, 
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since the enforcement of employer over-representation shall be expressly 
deemed ex parte abuse of rights and sanctioned. 
 d) The range of eligible management options for associated parties was 
considerably extended, which is most conspicuously instantiated under 
the rules governing corporations. As to close corporations, the application 
of the option of the German drei Ecken (triangular) system, which 
constitutes the principal rule, is an alternative to the jointly applicable 
institutions of one-entity management as per Article 247 and of the 
executive supervisory board, the power of which was expanded as per 
Article 37. As to public corporations, the German management system 
established in Hungary is simultaneously instituted with the optional 
Anglo-American integrate management system, furthermore, new organs, 
such as the auditing board are also introduced. The establishment of 
optional organs, such as advisory bodies and boards modelled on the 
German Beirat is admissible with general effect as per Para. (6) of 
Article 19. 
 e) The procedural auxiliary of the enhancement of permissiveness in 
substantive law consists in guaranteeing broader access to institutional 
and ad hoc arbitration courts in lieu of administrative courts for intent 
parties. Pursuant to Article 10 of ABA, the range of options for recourse 
to arbitration courts is extended in two respects. On the one hand, 
recourse to arbitration courts abroad is also secured for associations 
with exclusively Hungarian members, on the other hand, it is merely 
in re legal disputes between the association and the members that 
guaranteeing the opportunity for recourse to arbitration courts and the 
specification of one arbitration court in deeds of association shall be 
mandatory, whereas, irrespective of the before-mentioned criterion, for 
the settlement of disputes among members concerning the operation of 
the association, the members may resort to arbitration courts as well as 
may institute various arbitration courts.  
 
 
5. Conflicts of Interests 
 
Besides the protection of reasonable entrepreneurial interests, the third ABA 
purports to safeguard other interests, as well. Albeit, the business association is 
possessed primarily by its members, the proprietors, the enforcement of the 
interests of other parties must also be protected by law. To that effect, protection 
of the interests of the management is guaranteed by, e.g., the institution of 
exoneration pursuant to Para. (5) of Article 30. Furthermore, the former 10 p.c. 
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limit of the admission of collective minority protection was decreased to 5 p.c. 
pursuant to Para. (1) of Article 49, finally, the instruments of creditor protection 
were elucidated and circumscribed, for instance, in re the so-called company 
vacation, the scope of protection was extended to limited partners of limited 
partnerships (bt.) pursuant to Para. (3) of Article 50. 
 As a matter of course, protected interests may conflict. Consequently, in 
my judgement, Para. (3) of Article 30 adopted during parliamentary debate upon 
the motion of an MP is defective, since it makes an exception to the principal 
rule as per Para. (2) of Article 30, according to which executive officials of the 
association shall proceed with regard to the primacy of the interests of the 
association, by the prescription of the obligation of executive officials to 
observe the primacy of creditors’ interests “subsequently to the supervention 
of the minatory situation of insolvency of the association”. Scilicet, executive 
officials constitute an organ of the association and shall proceed upon the trust 
of the general/members’ meeting, therefore, they shall promote members’ 
interests. Whereas, creditors’ interests are basically protected under the ABP 
and other law along with the ABA, which shall be obviously observed by 
executive officials. Apart from the bona fide adherence to legal regulations, 
which explicitly precludes resort to irresponsible hazardous solutions, whats-
oever, executive officials may not further creditors’ interests as opposed to the 
interests of the association. Furthermore, on condition that the association 
declares insolvency and the executive officials do not proceed with regard to 
the primacy of creditors’ interests, Para. (3) of Article 30 also stipulates that 
separate law will lay down the liability of executive officials for creditors’ 
interests. However, as to the regulation of limited liability companies, even the 
establishment of the secondary liability of members shall be exceptional, there-
fore, the specification that non-member officials shall accept responsibility in 
lieu of the association and the members is an overtly excessive rule in my 
view, an instance of the overreach of wrongful trading. The according law 
founding such responsibility was adopted pursuant to Article 33/A of Act VI of 
2006 amending the ABP, which circumscribes the supervention of the minatory 
situation of insolvency, grounds for the presumption of the infringement of 
creditors’ interests, classifies liabilities for damages as debts to creditors and 
defines the imputation of executive officials, etc. According to my view, that 
qualifies as an overbreadth of law-making. In this context, we must also refer 
to Article 50 of ABA, in terms of which the court may transfer liability to the 
members of the ltd. or the corporation, the scope of which, nevertheless, is 
inordinately extended both under the Company Act and the amendment of the 
ABP, whereas, the admission of the transfer of responsibility is extremely 
exceptional in international legal practice. Notwithstanding, the provisions 
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under Paras. (2)–(3) of Article 63 of ABP and Paras. (1)–(2) of Article 93 of 
Company Act unreasonably extend the scope of the transfer of responsibility. 
En passant, the Company Act is not assigned to supplement the substantive 
rules of the ABA, such as the prescription of a separate rule of the transfer of 
responsibility, provided that the remaining total debt of the terminated 
association exceeds 50 p.c. of its equity capital. 
 In view of the fact that the entrepreneur jeopardises its private property, the 
liberalisation of the regulation in this scope is justifiable. However, the case of 
business associations operating with public funds is assessed differently. The 
rigour of requirements in re associations operating with state (local govern-
ment) participation with majority interest as well as in re public corporations 
operating with significant investment by natural entities must obviously not be 
mitigated, but affirmed as opposed to the general tendency of liberalisation. 
Additional requirements concerning associations operating in the public sector 
must be formulated fundamentally under the Act on the State Budget in a 
similar manner to the amendment of the before-mentioned law by the so-called 
Transparency Act of 2003. Undoubtedly, the requirements concerning the 
corporate governance of associations in public property will have to be radically 
emended under a new Act on the State Budget.  
 
 
6. Streamlining and Economising Firmregistration Procedures − 
 Functional Changes Concerning the Court of Registration 
 
The necessary implications of the enforcement of a pro-entrepreneurial 
approach consist in the freedoms of streamlined and economical formation of 
business associations, effectuation of required changes in deeds of association 
and in the forms of association, contingent termination of associations without 
the violation of public interest, such as authoritativeness of the trade register, 
creditors’ interests, etc.  
 As a matter of fact, streamlining the procedure of company registration and 
the introduction of electronic company procedures supervened before drafting 
the third ABA, wherefore, of course, the pertinent regulation was further 
amended. In this respect, the new rules pursuant to Para. (6) of Article 46 and 
Article 47 of Firmregistration Act are of fundamental importance, since the 
formerly differentiated registration of associations with investments by legal 
and non-legal entities was superseded, the term of registration was determined 
in a maximum of 15 working days as of submission of the respective claim and 
safeguards for the potential omission of the deadline were specified. As elements 
of basic streamlining, patterns of legal deeds of association were introduced 
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pursuant to Articles 48–49 of Firmregistration Act [four patterns, one for 
unlimited, one for limited partnerships and two patterns for (one-entity, multi-
entity) ltd.s], in case of the application of which, the term of registration shall 
be restricted to 8 working days for submission of claims on paper and to 2 
working days for electronic submission.  
 The specification of the freedom of expressly voluntary application of the 
patterns of legal deeds of association is notably unprecedented in domestic 
business law, therefore, it has been contested by several legal theorists, attorneys 
and registry judges. In my judgement, the application of the pattern is expedient 
for the simplest forms of association, since it crucially effects streamlining and 
no complex contractual procedure is required in re small-scale enterprises. 
Consequently, those who agree to the application of the simple patterns without 
changes will be facilitated to establish associations more expeditiously. 
Whereas, those who intend to establish more complex associations (e.g., with 
several managers and supervisory boards at ltd.s) will conclude deviating and 
individual deeds of association. 
 In my view, the patterns will also promote the economisation of the formation 
of small-scale enterprises in the long run, therefore, it is inappropriate to regard 
them as “awkward procedures”. As a modus vivendi, mandatory endorsement by 
attorneys, which is unknown in Western Europe, was upheld, however, in the 
future, that requirement may be naturally cancelled in re deeds of association 
concluded according to patterns, and with the expansion of the market, attorneys’ 
fees will evidently decrease, as well. Since the scale of contribution by the 
Court of Registration to the formation of associations on grounds of patterns is 
negligible, the respective fees will be soon and necessarily reduced by the 
Ministry of Finance. Furthermore, upon the following revision of the institu-
tions of the ABA, the publication of the formation of these simple associations 
will be obviously deemed unnecessary, whence, the related costs may also be 
released. Eventually, the facilitation of the formation of associations is also 
furthered by the procedure of the reservation of the name of the company 
under Article 6 of Firmregistration Act, which specifies the freedom to reserve 
the name opted for by the associated parties for a period of 60 days.  
 Nevertheless, other company procedures have also been consequentially 
streamlined. In this context, we must refer to the simplification of the conclusion 
of deeds of association under Article 18 of ABA, which, e.g., authorises the 
management to effect minimal changes in deeds of association. Furthermore, 
by the definition of reorganisation as a change in the form of the association, 
the elements of the three-pillared structure of reorganisation, association and 
dissolution were more unequivocally distinguished under Article 67 of ABA. 
Again, the process of reorganisation was momentously streamlined under 
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Articles 71-72 of ABA, wherefore, in a basic case, a session of the chief organ 
may effectuate reorganisation as well as the scope of the obligation to draft a 
reorganisation plan was restricted, etc. In order to resolve former uncertainties, 
it is expressly stipulated that co-ordinate unions of legal entities may also 
reorganise as business associations, and, vice versa, then again, the dissolution 
agreement shall be concluded by members (not by the association) under Para. 
(3) of Article 84 of ABA. 
 In the scope of the regulation of the termination of business associations 
without legal successors, the procedural rules of final settlement were revoked 
under the ABP and introduced into the Firmregistration Act, which marks 
remarkable progress. Scilicet, final settlement is a procedure related to the 
termination of associations not substantiated by insolvency. Therefore, enactment 
of such separate regulation of final settlement will probably impel law-making 
to eventually frame up-to-date law pertaining to insolvency equivalent to the 
pertinent EU regulation, so that it can supersede the effective obsolete regulation 
of bankruptcy and liquidation proceedings. (Pursuant to Act VI of 2006, only 
a minor amendment of ABP was adopted.) In effect, final settlement was 
momentously differentiated under the new Firmregistration Act, wherefore, 
coerced and voluntary final settlements were distinguished and the scope of 
streamlined final settlement was extended. 
 Within the purview of the new Firmregistration Act, the procedures purporting 
to implement the termination of business associations are regulated (to some 
extent with reproachable “overindulgence”) in a considerably more refined 
manner, than before. Accordingly, associations shall be formed by ex nunc 
registration with constitutive effect and cancelled in a similar manner from the 
trade register. The Court of Registration shall terminate, that is, dissolve business 
associations ex officio, a) if the association was finally liquidated by court, 
b) in proceedings directed at the termination of phony companies with head-
quarters at unknown addresses as per Articles 89–93 of Firmregistration Act, 
c) on account of repeated, gross misdemeanors on the part of the association as 
per Article 84 of Firmregistration Act.  
 As the two latter-mentioned proceedings demonstrate, with the lapse of the 
boom of the formation of business associations and the establishment of the 
material and incorporate criteria of lawful and expeditious company procedures, 
the sphere of the activity of the Court of Registration has focused on the 
legality supervision of business associations, which is only partially designed 
to sanction, since it increasingly assumes functions of advocacy and assistance. 
The regulation of the procedure of legality supervision is more elaborate under 
Chapter 6 of Firmregistration Act, since it specifies new instruments of legality 
supervision, e.g., in parallel with by-law, the designation of supervisory trustees 
248 TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
  
ex officio is admissible as per Articles 82–83 of Firmregistration Act. Several 
peculiar procedures of legality supervision are further regulated under the 
Firmregistration Act, such as the appointment of an official receiver as per 
Article 85 as well as the enforcement of the deposition or publication of 
company reports as per Article 87. The settlement of the equivocal financial 
situation following the termination of the business association is promoted by 
the procedure of financial settlement introduced formerly and regulated as per 
Chapter 9 of Firmregistration Act. 
 
 
 
 
 
